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ETWEEN SEPTEMBER 1992 and August
1993, the European Monetary System (EMS)
went through the most serious crisis since its
start in 1979. Member countries cross-pegging
their exchange rates in the framework of the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) were confront-
ed with a string of speculative currency attacks.
Associated with these attacks were five realign-
ments and the suspension of two major
currencies—the Italian lira and the British
pound—from the ERM. The situation eased off
only when the fluctuation margins were widened
considerably in August 1993.
There are two reasons to review these events.
First, there had been no genuine realignment in
the EMS for more than five years. The EMS had
widely come to be seen as a model for a viable
pegged exchange rate system. Second, most of
the recent cases of speculative currency attacks
occurred in developing countries, where access
to foreign exchange reserves is rather limited
and capital controls usually play an important
role in maintaining pegged exchange rates?
Hence, the near-collapse of the ERM provides
a useful example of a speculative attack under
1See Edwards (1989) for a detailed analysis of devaluations
in developing countries.
2There is a vast literature on the EMS. Ungerer, et al. (1983,
1986, 1990) provide accessible reviews of EMS develop-
ments. Also see Fratianni and von Hagen (1992), Giavazzi
and Giovannini (1989), and Gros and Thygesen (1992) for
more advanced discussions.
conditions of easy access to foreign exchange
reserves and free capital mobility.
This article concentrates on the British epi-
sode in the EMS crisis. Since the United King-
dom’s participation in the ERM was suspended
in September 1992, only the early phase of the
crisis is covered. First, I describe a brief history
of the pound in the EMS. Next, I have selected
macroeconomic indicators on the eve of the cri-
sis to provide a picture of the economic situa-
tion and the credibility of the exchange rate
band as perceived by the markets. Then, I dis-
cuss the main features of the speculative attack
on the pound against the background of the
basic model of balance-of.payments crisis. To
this end, I introduce the model originated by
Krugman (1979), along with extensions motivated
by the British situation.
BRITAIN’S PARTICIPATION
in the ERM2
When the EMS started operating on March 8,
1979, Britain did not participate in the central
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piece of the new system, the ERM? In the view
of British monetary authorities, the loss of room
for maneuvering under a system of pegged
exchange rates outweighed probable gains. Many
observers did not give the ERM much credit
either. Some predicted an inflationary bias,
while others expected the system to he drawn
apart soon by the widely differing inflation rates
among participating countries. In the event, the
ERM performed surprisingly well. Inflation rates
decreased substantially (albeit not more than in
non-ERM countries), and the variability of nomi-
nal and real effective exchange rates fell a great
deal.
Certainly, many realignments were required
for the ERM to survive during its early years.
The 17 realignments witnessed in the period
1979-93 are summarized in Table 1.~ ‘fivo fea-
tures stand out. First, the deutsche mark never
was devalued against other ERM currencies.
Second, realignments became less frequent until
1992, reflecting the decline in intra-ERM infla-
tion rate differentials.~
Capital controls also played a role in the
survival of the ERM. They had intensified in the
final years of the Bretton Woods System and
many European countries continued to use them
after that. It was not until 1988 that an EC
directive stipulated the complete liberalization of
capital movements. For’ most member countries,
this was accomplished by mid-1990 (extensions
were granted for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spahi).
Britain chose a different way. Rather than
participate in the ERM when it began in 1979,
Britain decided to pursue a deliberately tight
monetary policy based on a free float and
growth targets for monetary aggregates. Capital
controls were removed rapidly and fiscal policy
was oriented toward balancing the budget.8 This
strategy resulted in a large reduction of inflation
(from 18 percent in 1980 to less than 5 percent
in 1983), albeit at the price of substantial output
losses. A complicating factor was the increasingly
unstable relationship between the targeted
monetary aggregate (sterling M3) and nominal
income.’ This made sterling M3 a questionable
indicator, which risked a reduction in the credi-
bility of monetary policy. In response, monetary
authorities tried several alternatives. First, sever-
al aggregates were targeted simultaneously.
Then, the emphasis shifted to narrow monetary
aggregates. Finally, in 1987-88, the free float was
replaced by a managed exchange rate shadowing
the deutsche mark.
In retrospect, the mark exchange rate target-
ing of 1987-88 was an ill-fated attempt at finding
a stable nominal anchor. Initially, monetary poli-
cy loosened due to the determination of the
government to stick with the unofficial target
exchange rate of 3 marks per pound. As a
result, the economy overheated and forced
monetary authorities to tighten the policy stance
and to let the pound appreciate.8
Despite this troubled experience with an
exchange-rate oriented policy, ERM membership
remained an option favored by the chancellor of
the exchequer, Nigel Lawson, and supported by
leading husinesspeople. Tn June 1989, at the EU
summit in Madrid, the government set the
terms for Britain’s entry to the ERM. These
terms were: British inflation close to the EU
average; i-cal progress towards completion of
3The EMS includes all members of the European Communi-
ty (EC). The ERM originally included only Belgium-
Luxembourg, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy and
the Netherlands. Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom
joined in April 1992, January 1990, and October 1990,
respectively. Italy and the United Kingdom suspended their
participation in the ERM in September 1992. Greece has
never participated in the ERM.
~Itmay be argued that there were only 16 genuine realign-
ments. On January 8, 1990, when the Italian lira switched
from ±6 percent to ±2.25 percent fluctuation margins,
the central rate was devalued relative to the current market
rate. The new lower intervention margins were not below
the old margins, however, except for the Spanish peseta
exchange rate of the lira.
5Giavazzi and Giovannmni, among many others, argue that
the EMS became a greater deutsche mark area by 1983;
Germany is the center country, and countries such as Italy
and France peg their currencies to the mark. See Fratianni
and von Hagen for qualifications of this view.
~Achronological account of British economic policy is
provided by the annual surveys on the United Kingdom
published bythe Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD).
‘Sterling M3 is MS less residents’ deposits abroad.
8See Belongia and Chrystal (1990) for a critical discussion
of this episode.
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the single European market; financial-market
liberalization; end of exchange controls; and
strengthened competition policy in the EC.9
When Britain actually joined the ERM 15 months
later, all conditions except inflation convergence
were virtually met?”
Britain Enters the ERM
Britain entered the ERM on October 8, 1990,
with fluctuation margins of ±6 percent around
bilateral central rates, instead of the usual ±
2.25 percent.” As with Italy and Spain before, and
Portugal later, the ERM allowed wider margins
to provide the newcomer some flexibility to ad-
just. By joining the ERM, Britain committed itself
to keeping the exchange rate within these mar-
gins. Essentially, two instruments were available
to this end: interest rate policies and direct in-
terventions on the foreign exchange market?2
Consider a case where the pound approaches
the lower margin of its deutsche mark band.
The Bank of England can sell foreign currency
or it may raise short-term interest rates to pre-
vent the pound from depreciating further. lb
finance the intervention, it may either draw on
its own reserves or borrow from other sources
(international capital markets, central banks). In
the ERM, access to foreign exchange reserves is
facilitated by the Very Short-lerm Financing
Facility (VSTF). Under the VSTF, the Bank of
9See OECD(1989/1990), p. 40.
‘°Theremay have been short-term reasons to speed up
Britain’s entry in the second half of 1990. With the inter-
governmental conference on monetary union scheduled for
December 1990, Britain knew that it had to be part of the
ERM if it wished to influence the path of monetary integra-
tion in the EC. Furthermore, a general election was
approaching, and the government could expect ERM mem-
bership to provide some honeymoon” effect by allowing
pound interest rates to fall without jeopardizing the
exchange rate.
“The effective margins were approximately —2.22 percent
and +2.28 percent for the narrow (4.5 percent) bands, and
—5.82 percent and +6.18 percent for the wide (12 percent)
bands. Margins of about ±2.25 percent and ±6 percent
would violate the condition that central bank A’s compulso-
ry buying rate for currency B must be the same as central
bank B’s compulsory selling rate for currency A.
“In Britain, changes in the policy stance are typically sig-
naled by changes in short-term interest rates. See Batten
et al. (1990) for a discussion of the operating procedures.
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England is allowed to borrow marks from the
Bundesbank virtually without limits. The
Bundesbank is obliged to grant such credits
upon request?3
After Britain joined the ERM, the pound
moved most of the time comfortably in the ±6
percent band around its central rate. After a
temporary appreciation, the pound stayed for
more than one year in an implicit narrower
band in the neighborhood of ±2.25 percent
around central parity. Pressure on the pound
usually was short-lived and quickly reversed by
either a slight increase in domestic interest rates
or modest interventions in the foreign exchange
market. Interest rates were raised temporarily
when Margaret Thatcher stepped down as
prime minister in November 1990 and in the
weeks before the general election of April 1992,
when opinion polls pointed to a victory for the
opposition Labour party. On the whole, however,
interest rates (as well as inflation) decreased
substantially during the period Britain partici-
pated in the ERM.
Tensions in the ERM
The tensions in the foreign exchange markets
that finally led to the near-collapse of the ERM
in September 1992 were triggered by doubts
about the progress toward monetary union?~
In June 1992, the Danes had voted no in a
referendum on the Maastricht Tt1’eaty, which
included a chapter on European Monetary
Union (EMU). Moreover, the outcome of the
French referendum on the treaty in September
was expected to be close. Since the prospect of
monetary union had provided an anchor for
expectations, the outlook for the current parities
in the ERM looked rather bleak if France reject-
ed the treaty also. For reasons discussed below,
pressure on the exchange rate became most
notable first in Italy, where the discount rate
was raised over the summer of 1992 in several
steps, from 12 percent to 15 percent. The pound
felt some pressure too, and British monetary
authorities began to step up interventions on
the foreign exchange market in late August.
On September 3, 1992, Britain announced a
program to borrow ECU 10 billion, about $14.3
billion (U.S.) at the time, in the international
market to increase foreign exchange reserves.
Ultimately, the rise in domestic interest rates
did not save the Italian lira. On September 13,
the lira’s central rate was devalued by 7 percent.
TWo days later, Germany slightly eased monetary
policy. The discount rate was lowered by 50
basis points to 8.25 percent and the Lombard
rate was lowered by 25 basis points to 9.5 per-
cent. These adjustments—the first German in-
terest rate cuts in nearly five years—were
perceived as unexpectedly small by the markets,
and comments attributed to the Bundesbank
president, who appeared to question the ade-
quacy of the pound’s central rate (subsequently
denied), raised tensions further?~
Britain Withdraws from the ERM
On September 16—Black Wednesday—the Bank
of England intervened massively on the foreign
exchange market to prevent the pound from
falling below the lower margin of its Deutsche
mark band. Furthermore, it raised the base
lending rate from 10 to 12 percent and an-
nounced later in the day a further rise to 15
percent, to be effective the following morning.
These measures did not succeed in relieving the
pressure on the pound. In the evening, British
monetary authorities announced the temporary
suspension of the pound from the ERM. It
seemed hardly feasible to fix a new parity less
‘3Even if access to the VSTF is said to be unlimited, this is
not literally true. The Bundesbank has two reasons to
make sure that the VSTF is not overburdened. First, it
bears an exchange rate risk since the credits are denomi-
nated in European Currency Unit (ECU), a basket currency
defined by fixed quantities of member currencies. So, if the
pound depreciates relative to the mark, the Bundesbank
will be repaid the value of depreciated ECU. Second, the
selling of the mark during interventions raises Germany’s
monetary base and would jeopardize its inflation objective
unless the Bundesbank is able to sterilize the intervention.
Therefore, the Bundesbank insisted right from the start of
the ERM on an opt-out clause. According to Central Bank-
ing (1992; Robert Pringle, ed), this clause was confirmed
in a letter to the German government by the then-president
of the bank, Otmar Emminger.
‘4For a detailed account of the events prior to Britain’s with-
drawal from the ERM, see Bank of England Quarterly Bulle-
tin (November 1992).
‘5See Financial Times, September 15, 1992, and September
16, 1992, respectively. As is now known, the Bundesbank
actually did suggest a trade—with the size of German in-
terest cuts depending on the size of the realignment—to
the chairman of the EC Monetary Committee. Since the
Italian lira finally was the only currency devalued on Sep-
tember 13, German interest rate cuts consequently were
small; see Financial Times, December 11, 1992, for a
detailed account.
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than a week before the French referendum on
the Maastricht ‘Theaty The next day, the base
lending rate was moved back to 10 percent. At
the same time, Italy announced the lira’s tem-
porary withdrawal from the ERM, while Spain
devalued its currency by 5 percent and imposed
temporary capital controls.
The floating of the pound marks the end of
Britain’s ERM episode. In the following weeks,
when the markets did not calm down after the
French had narrowly approved the Maastricht
‘meaty, it became clear thai Britain and Italy
would not rejoin quickly ‘The ERM struggled on
for another 10 months. Then, on August 2,
1993, EC member states decided to raise the
margins of the exchange rate bands to ±15per-
cent around the central parities, an action com-
ing close to a suspension of the system. The old
margins continued to be valid only for the
deutsche mark/Dutch guilder exchange rate.
In retrospect, the distinctive feature of
Britain’s defense of the pound was the almost
complete lack of interest rate policies. Domestic
interest rates were raised only on the final day
of the crisis and the size of this rise was rather
small. Most other weak-currency countries in
the 1992-93 crisis of the EMS raised their short-
term interest rates more aggressively?6 As indi-
cated above, however, this did not provide them




When Britain participated in the ERM, British
monetary authorities regularly emphasized their
commitment to the established exchange rate
parities. It is not enough to make such a pledge,
however. The market has to be convinced that
monetary authorities have no incentive to drop
their commitment and that they will take
whatever action is necessary to defend the pan-
ties. This, of course, turns out to be difficult.
The market knows that pegging the exchange
rate ultimately is a conditional commitment. Ex-
pectations are formed that monetary authorities
will realign if the perceived cost of defending
the exchange rate is larger than the perceived
cost of a realignment. This section takes a look
at selected macroeconomic indicators and asks
whether the exchange rate target bands were
perceived as credible by the markets.
General Economic Conditions
Table 2 shows macroeconomic indicators on
the eve of the crisis for all countries participat-
ing in the ERM (except Portugal, because of data
limitations). The countries are ordered in terms
of their relative size (measured by GDP). Indica-
tors refer to August 1992 for monthly data and
the second quarter of 1992 for quarterly data.
Annual figures are OECD forecasts for 1992,
published in June of the same year. The indica-
tors can roughly be divided into three groups:
monetary indicators (money supply growth,
short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate);
fiscal indicators (primary deficit/GDP ratio,
debt/GDP ratio); and indicators describing final
goals (output growth, inflation)?~
These indicators shed some light on the diver-
gent economic forces in the ERM. The most im-
portant single event hitting the EC during recent
years has been German unification. Basic eco-
nomic theory suggests that the German unifica-
tion would lead to an increase in that country’s
aggregate demand and a real appreciation of the
mark (where tile real appreciation is equal to
the nominal appreciation adjusted by the infla-
tion rate differential against foreign countries).
These effects were heightened by the decision
to finance higher public spending by borrowing
rather than by raising taxes?8 Under pegged ex-
change rates, the real appreciation of the mark
is brought about by a positive inflation differen-
tial between Germany and the other ERM
member countries. Since the Bundesbank was
‘°SeeGoldstein et al. (1993), Annex VI and the statistical
appendix in particular.
“Four out of the seven indicators closely correspond to the
macroeconomic convergence criteria for EMU mentioned in
the Maastricht Treaty. These criteria are: (1) the inflation
rate of the country under review must not exceed the aver-
age of the three EC countries with the lowest inflation rate
by more than 1.5 percent; (2) the interest rate on long-term
government securities must not be more than 2 percentage
points higher than the average rate of the same three
countries; (3) the budget deficit must not exceed 3 percent
of GDP; and (4) the public debt/GDP ratio must not exceed
60 percent. Note, however, that table 2 uses the primary
deficit (i.e. the budget deficit net of interest payments) to
indicate whether the evolution of the fiscal indicators goes
in the direction required by the EMU criteria.
‘8These are short-run effects. In the long run, an expansion-
ary fiscal policy that permanently raises the debt/GDP ratio
will cause the real exchange rate to fall, since the country
must export more to offset the effects of the decline in its
net external asset position.
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detertnined to keep inflation low and to let
short-term interest rates rise, the required real
appreciation of the mark could come only by a
substantial reduction in inflation in the other
countries.
So, Germany’s economic policy on the eve of
Britain’s crisis was characterized by a slightly
loose fiscal policy (reflected in the primary
deficit) and a tight monetary policy (at least as
reflected in short-term interest rates of nearly
10 percent, substantially higher than the infla-
tion rates). Despite slow output growth in
Germany, the chances of German interest rate
cuts seemed bleak. The growth of the German
money supply still was above the target range
and the inflation rate—running at 3.5 percent
and accelerating—was considered too high.
What were the specific problems of Britain,
Italy and Spain, the three large EC countries
forced to adjust their currencies in September
1,992? Table 2 indicates that a deficit in the
primary balance was expected for Britain and
Italy. This was much more trouhlesotne for Italy,
since Britain’s debt/GOP ratio was low, while
Italy actually had to realize substantial surpluses
to reduce its large debt/GDP ratio in view of EMU.
Britain was in an even better position with
regard to inflation. Italy and Spain clearly had
an inflation problem reflected in both inflation
rates and long-term interest rates. Despite some
success in bringing inflation rates down from
double-digit levels, there was still a substantial
gap compared with the other ERM countries.
Britain, on the other hand, had inflation and
long-term interest rates below the average of the
ERM countries. Britain’s main problem was rela-
tively slow growth. The (JECD’s forecasts for
GDP growth in 1992 had Britain at the bottom
of the EC countries. Starting in 1990, the British
recession had been particularly stubborn, and
hopes for an economic recovery had been disap-
pointed repeatedly. As a result, it was difficult
not only to accept the current interest rate level
imposed by Germany, hut also to convince the
market that domestic interest rates would be
raised even further should the pound come
under pressure.
No attempt is made in table 2 to weigh the
various indicators to calculate an overall
weighted-average indicator for each country.
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A review of EMS realignments since 1979, how-
evet~indicates that the chief cause for a devalu-
ation was probably a persistent inflation differen-
tial, leading to an overvaluation of the currency.
Such an overvaluation often was built up over
an extended period of tine. Therefore, a better
indicator than an annual performance measure
is the cumulated rate of change of the real ex-
change rate over the period starting with the
date when the current parities were established.
Movements in the Real
Exchange Rates
Figure 1 shows the real mark/pound exchange
rate when Britain participated in the ERM.
Nominal exchange rates, the margins of the
exchange rate band, and cost or price differen-
tials are given for convenience. There are vari-
ous ways to calculate real exchange rates. Here,
two indexes were calculated. The first is based
on unit labor cost, and the second on consumer
prices?9 Note that unit labor cost data are quart-
erly (ending in the second quarter of 1992),
while consumer price data are monthly (ending
in August 1992). Hence, the top graph of figure
1 (quarterly data) does not have the pound fall-
ing to the lower margin at the very end of the
period. Both indexes show that cumulated infla-
tion differentials were very small on the eve of
the collapse (0.05 percent for consumer prices
and 1.4 percent for unit labor cost). Since the
nominal exchange rate of the pound depreciated
inside the band, both measures of the real
exchange rate indicate that the mark price of
the pound was lower in real terms compared
to its entry level.
Figures 2-4 repeat this exercise for France,
Italy and Spain, the three other, major, non-
German countries participating in the ERM.
Only the real exchange rates based on consumer
prices are shown. The starting dates differ ac-
cording to the preceding realignment (January
1987 for both the French franc and the Italian
lira) or the entry to the ERM (January 1990 for
Spain).20 The figures exhibit substantial real ap-
preciation for both the Italian lira and (to a less-
er extent) the Spanish peseta. The franc, while
appreciating in real terms during the first few
years, largely retraced its rise by 1990 thanks to
low inflation.
Overall, the evolution of the real exchange
rate does not point to the pound (or the franc)
as a candidate for a devaluation.21 There was
nothing like the usual pattern of an increasing
overvaluation due to a persistent inflation rate
differential. Still, theme was the discrepancy be-
tween the cyclical needs of the British economy
and the high interest rates imposed on the ERM
by Germany. The next section examines the per-
ception of the exchange rate band’s credibility
before the speculative currency attacks actually
forced the withdrawal of the pound (and the
lira) from the ERM.
Perceptions of Britain’s Credibility
in the ERM
A simple way to assess an exchange rate
band’s credibility is based on uncovered interest
rate parity.zz Uncovered interest rate parity
states that under perfect international capital
mobility and risk-neutral speculation, the
differential between nominal domestic and for-
eign interest rates is equal to the anticipated
rate of depreciation of the domestic currency.
So, given the current exchange rate and domes-
tic and foreign interest rates for various maturi-
ties, the expected exchange rate for these
maturities can be calculated. Then, the band is
said to be credible if the expected exchange rate
is within the margins of the band.23
Figure 5 shows the results for the mark/pound
exchange rate when Britain participated in the
ERM. The time horizons are three months, 12
~Consumerprices excluding mortgage rates are used for
Britain in this calculation, but not in table 2. The former
measure is widely seen as a better indicator of core infla-
tion. If a tight monetary policy raises interest rates, includ-
ing mortgage rates, the overall price index may actually
show an acceleration of inflation, while the brakes on infla-
tion are already in place. Britain’s inflation would be lower
(and the real depreciation of the pound even more
pronounced) if the overall consumer price index were
taken, since interest rates were falling during much of the
period under review.
20Again, the realignment of January 8, 1990, caused by the
switch of the Italian lira to a narrow band is ignored. See
footnote 4 for explanations.
21There may have been real factors leading to a lower real
mark/pound equilibrium rate, however. Also, the central par-
ity may have been too ambitious from the beginning. Note
that the real Deutsche mark/pound exchange rate was low-
er in October 1990 than during most of the 1980s.
22This test was originated by Svensson (1991).
2Slf the assumption of risk-neutrality is dropped, a term for
risk premia must be included in the interest rate parity
condition. Svensson (1992) showed that these premia are
very small for narrow exchange rate bands.
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Figure 1
Nominal and Real DM/Pound Exchange Rates
Index (1990.3=100)
Nominal and Real DM/Pound Exchange Rates
Index (1990.10=100)
Monthly Data
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Figure 2
Nominal and Real DM/French Franc Exchange Rates
Index (1987.01=100)
Monthly Data (January 1987 to August 1992)
II I
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Nominal and Real DM/ltalian Lira Exchange Rates
Index (1987.01=100)
Monthly Data (January 1987 to August 1992)
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Nominal and Real DM/Spanish Peseta Exchange Rates
Index (1990.01 =100)
Monthly Data (January 1987 to August 1992)
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months and five years, hased on interest rate
differentials. Interest rates for three and 12
months are Euromarket rates, guaranteeing that
the deposits are comparable in every respect ex-
cept currency denomination. The interest rates
for five years are based on government bond
yields, since no Euromarket rates are readily
available for maturities of more than 12 months.
The data are daily.
The results indicate that the expected exchange
rate always moved within the margins of the
band for maturities up to 12 months until
mid-August 1992. For maturities of five years,
however, the expected exchange rate most of the
time was outside the margins. The latter result
implies that there were some lingering doubts
about the long-term credibility of the mark!
pound exchange rate band. Nevertheless, a crisis
was not perceived as particularly likely. Doubts
about the short- or medium-term credibility of
the band arose only immediately before the par-
ity actually was attacked.
Using monthly data for 12 months, the same
exercise was applied to the franc, the lira and
the peseta during the periods these currencies
were participating in the ERM. The results,
summarized in figures 6-8, show that the
credibility of the band derived for the pound
cannot be generalized to apply to other EMS
countries throughout the period of their par-
ticipation. The expected future exchange rates
of both the franc and the lira mostly were
outside the margins of the bands during 1979-89.
Since 1989, the expected future exchange rates
of ERM currencies usually were within the
margins.2~
Rose and Svensson (1991) proposed a slightly
more elaborate technique to assess the credibili-
ty of exchange rate bands.25 They split the total
rate of depreciation implied by the interest rate
differential into the expected rate of deprecia-
tion within the band and the expected rate of
realignment. The expected rate of depreciation
within the band (conditional upon no realign-
ment) is estimated under the assumption of
rational expectations using realized exchange
rate data. The result is deducted from the in-
terest rate differential to get the expected rate
of realignment.26 Rose (1993) recently used this
method to calculate expected realignment rates
for the mark!pound exchange rate. He shows
that expectations of a pound realignment were
low throughout most of 1992. The pound’s
credibility was not in reasonable doubt until
mid-August 1992, at the earliest.
Overall, the credibility measures indicate thai
the successful speculative attack on the pound
was not anticipated well in advance. The diver-
gent economic forces stemming from German
unification—well known for quite some time—
did not result in a prompt decline in the ex-
change rate band’s credibility Signs of an ap-
proaching crisis were strikingly rare. To gain a
broader picture of the timing and the dynamics
of the speculative attack, the next section con-
siders the basic model of a balance-of-payments
crisis.
THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A
SPECULATIVE ATTACK
To clarify Britain’s problem in the ERM, an
outline of the basic model of speculative curren-
cy attacks that has dominated the recent litera-
ture follows. Also reviewed are some extensions
motivated by the preceding discussion of the
British episode. These extensions include the
roles of interest rate pegging, borrowing and
capital controls.27
Some Theoretical Considerations
Consider a situation of a currency whose
value is pegged to a foreign currency. The
foreign interest rate is assumed to be constant.
There is no commercial banking sector, and the
supply of money is equal to the total of both
‘4See Frankel and Phillips (1991) for an investigation of credi-
bility in the EMS using survey data on expected exchange
rates in addition to interest rate differentials.
253ee Svensson (1993) for an application on EMS data.
26lt is assumed that the position of the exchange rate inside
the band is the same before and after the realignment.
While this makes it possible to interpret the result as the
expected rate of realignment, it is somewhat at odds with
the facts. After most realignments, the exchange rate
lumped toward the upper margin of the band.
27The literature on speculative currency attacks starts with
Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984b). Flood and
Garber (1984a) and Obstfeld (1986) analyzed self-fulling at-
tacks and multiple equilibria. Agënor et al. (1992) and
Blackburn and Sola (1993) provide selective reviews of the
fast-growing literature. For an excellent non-technical
description, see Goldstein et al. (1993), Annex V.52
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domestic credit and foreign assets held on the
central bank’s balance sheet. Now, imagine that
all domestic assets are increasing at a steady
pace, in part, to finance a chronic government
budget deficit. Since the exchange rate (defined
as the foreign currency price of one unit of
home currency) is fixed, a steady outflow of
foreign exchange reserves occurs if the growth
of domestic credit exceeds the growth of money
demand. In this case, foreign exchange reserves
eventually are exhausted and the central bank
has to withdraw from foreign exchange inter-
vention. Once exchange rates at-c flexible, the
price level will rise and the exchange rate will
fall at the same pace as domestic credit growth
in excess of money demand.
There is a problem, however. At the moment
of the switch to a flexible exchange rate, inves-
tors with assets denominated in domestic cur-
rency suffer a capital loss since the exchange
rate falls discretely. Consequently, forward-
looking speculators, foreseeing the imminent col-
lapse, would try to sell domestic currency and
buy foreign currency before the central bank
runs out of reserves. A speculative attack on the
foreign exchange reserves of the central bank
takes place, and a collapse occurs. With perfect
foresight, no discrete drop in the exchange rate
occurs at the time of the collapse.
For assessing the timing of the attack, it is
useful to look at the so-called shadow exchange
rate.28 ‘i’he shadow exchange rate is the ex-
change rate that would result if the speculative
attack that exhausts all foreign exchange reserve
holdings of the central bank would take place
today. The speculative attack takes place when
the shadow exchange rate is equal to or below
the current exchange rate. As long as the
shadow exchange rate is higher than the current
(pegged) exchange rate, a speculative attack








29This is known in the literature as the peso problem.54
would bring losses for the speculator. On the
other side, a speculative attack is profitable if
the shadow exchange rate is lower than the cur-
rent (pegged) exchange rate. Competition among
speculators reduces expected losses and profits
down to zero. This story provides an explana-
tion of why a speculative attack may take place
even when the central bank still has sizable
reserves. The ultimate reason for the collapse is
the inconsistency of the pegged exchange rate
with the growth of domestic credit. But the
point to remember is the pivotal role of expecta-
tions in bringing the collapse forward.
Perfect foresight, however, is not a realistic
assumption. What happens when this assump-
tion is dropped? Imagine that there is uncer-
tainty either about domestic credit growth or
about the minimum size of foreign exchange
reserves that would cause the central bank to
adopt flexible exchange rates. Again, the
speculative attack takes place when the shadow
exchange rate is equal to or below the actual
rate. Now, however, uncertainty implies that
there is always a probability greater than zero
for the policy switch to take place in the next
period. Moreovet this probability increases over
time, since the decline in reserves makes it
more likely that the next realization of credit
growth forces the switch to a free float. As a
result, there is a positive (and, over time,
increasing) interest rate differential, implying an
expected depreciation of the home currency
exchange rate.29 In addition, there may be a
discrete drop in the exchange rate at the
moment of the policy switch. These regular
features of a balance-of-payments crisis are not
captured in the perfect-foresight case.
A chronic fiscal defIcit financed by the central
bank is thedriving force of the collapse described
above. This assumption does not meet the
experience of Britain in 1992. The Bank of
England did not have to finance a budget
deficit, domestic credit growth was low, and
there was no continuous outflow of reserves.
So, an alternative conceptual analysis would con-
sider a situation in which a country initially
adopts fiscal and monetary policies in line with
the maintenance of the pegged exchange rate.
Nevertheless, suppose the market expects the
central bank to switch to a free float and that
it would ease monetary policy if a speculative
attack exhausted the foreign exchange reserves
of the central bank. In contrast to the two cases
discussed above, the policy of the central bank
in this case is not exogenous to the speculative
currency attack. As a result, there may he sever-
al equilibria, depending on the expectations of
the market. If there is no attack, the exchange
rate is perfectly viable forever. If there is an
attack, the central bank gives in and accepts a
depreciation of its currency.
This model of a self-fulfilling speculative at-
tack is quite attractive in the context of the Brit-
ish case. Remember that the main reason for
joining the ERM was the credibility that the
ERM seemed to provide for monetary policy
Later, realignments were rejected repeatedly
because of the suspected risks to the credibility
of the system. So, when the speculative attack
on the pound revealed that the established
exchange rate parities actually had lost their
credibility, the situation had to be reevaluated.
The costs of defending the established parities
had increased and it was quite possible that
monetary authorities would regard these costs
as being too high.
The British Experience
The main characteristic of the defense of the
pound in September 1992 was the reluctance of
British monetary authorities to raise interest
rates. What are the implications of this policy
for speculative currency attacks?~° Consider the
general case with a pegged exchange rate and
selling pressure against the home currency. So
long as interest rates are free to move, competi-
tion among speculators for expected profits
from an attack on the home currency drives up
domestic interest rates. If the central bank pre-
vents these interest rates from rising, that brake
on the demand for foreign exchange disappears.
As a result, the central hank will have to absorb
the larger demand for foreign exchange. In the
end, the central bank, by pegging the interest
rate, offers the market a favorable opportunity
for a run on Britain’s reserves. Investors may
speculate at very low costs, and the speculative
currency attack thus easily may involve huge
amounts of funds.
A second characteristic of the British episode
was the government’s borrowing on the interna-
tional capital market to increase foreign exchange
30Goldstein et al. (1993) first examined this extension of the
basic model.
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change reserves. As emphasized above, a
speculative attack occurs when the shadow
exchange rate is equal to or below the current
pegged exchange rate. The size of the fot-eign
exchange reserves, in turn, has an effect on the
shadow exchange rate. Since a run on foreign
exchange reserves jeduces the domestic money
supply (assuming the effect is not sterilized), the
money supply reduction associated with running
out of a larger stock of foreign reserves is also
larger. The potentially larger reduction in the
domestic money supply, in turn, raises the
shadow exchange rate.
Another device to postpone speculative cur-
rency attacks is capital controls. While Britain
did not use them at all in 1992, the ERM crisis
in September 1992 was the first, since virtually
all capital controls in the EC had been removed.
Thus, it may be useful to take a look at how
capital controls work in a speculative currency
attack. The simplest way to model capital con-
troLs is to treat them like a tax on foreign
interest earnings. lb simplify the account, let
the starting point he a situation in which the
fundamentals aie in order: i.e., no chronic fiscal
deficit or other influence is causing a gradual
depletion of the central bank’s foreign exchange
reserves. The pre-tax foreign interest rate con-
tinues to he assumed as constant throughout
the analysis.
Since a speculative attack takes place when
the shadow exchange rate is equal to or below
the current pegged exchange i-ate, we direct our
attention again to the effects of the instrument
on the shadow exchange rate. A tax on foreign
interest earnings reduces the net return on
foreign assets. As a result, an excess supply of
foreign currency emerges at the current ex-
change rate. Since the exchange rate is pegged,
the excess supply must he absorbed by the cen-
tral bank. This leads to highet- foreign exchange
reserves, a higher money supply, and a reduc-
tion in the domestic interest rate (reflecting the
reduced level of the net return rate on foreign
assets). The increase in foreign exchange
reserves, in turn, raises the shadow exchange
rate in much the same way as in the example in
which reserves are increased by borrowing. A
tax on foreign interest earnings, by pushing up
the shadow exchange rate, may postpone a
speculative attack. To put it another way, the
removal of capital controls in the EC removed a
shelter for weak ERM currencies.3’
Over’all, the distaste of British monetary
authorities for allowing short-teim interest rates
to rise made the defense of the pound in Sep-
tember 1992 more difficult. The effects on
speculation were particularly grave since there
were no restrictions on capital movements.
Borrowing foreign exchange reserves by the
authorities—short of unliniited borrowing—
was no serious substitute under these circum-
stances.
CONCLUSIONS
The near collapse of the ERM in 1992-93
reflected the vulnerability of pegged exchange
rate systems. This feature of pegged exchange
rates is hardly new. Standard theory in interna-
tional macroeconomics teaches that monetary
autonomy and pegged exchange m-ates are incom-
patible in the absence of capital controls. Diver-
gent econonuc forces or simple political events
may trigger a speculative attack, leading to the
collapse of the pegged exchange rate.
For policymakers, the possibility that specula-
live currency attacks may be self-fulfilling is
particularly troublesome. In Europe, proponents
of pegged exchange rates have argued for years
that exchange rate pegging to the mark provides
a way to import the reputation of the Bundes-
hank and get a credible anchor for monetary
policy. For obvious reasons, this approach had a
special appeal to countries lacking a credible
monetary policy. Yet the argument is less con-
vincing if speculative attacks are self-fulfilling
and the credibility of a country’s exchange rate
commitment can vanish as quickly and unex-
pectedly as it did in September 1992.
310f course, capital controls are not as efficient as true taxes
on foreign exchange. More importantly, capital controls
typically are not introduced when there is no pressure on
foreign exchange reserves. Nevertheless, the analysis here
clarifies that capital controls can reduce the prevailing ex-
cess demand for foreign currency, boosting foreign ex-
change reserves and the shadow exchange rate. This
analysis ignores the reduction in incentives to invest in a
country that imposes capital controls as well, and this in-
fluence coutd also bode ill for any actual boost in the
shadow price.56
A necessary condition for such an attack to
occur is that the markets expect the central
bank to shift policy as a result of the attack. If
the markets have reasons to believe that a coun-
try will relax monetary policy once a specula-
tive attack has exhausted the central bank’s
reserves, an attack is more likely. In the case of
Britain, a persistent recession prepared the way
for such beliefs. Uncertainties about the pros-
pects for EMU and the reluctance of British
authorities to allow short-term interest rates to
rise in defense of the pound subsequently ac-
celerated the attack and reinforced a realign-
ment of the pound. In short, the United Kingdom
could not convince the markets of its commit-
ment to a fixed exchange rate. This credibility is
an essential factor in maintaining an effective
exchange regime.
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